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BOOK REVIEWS
Free Speech In The United States.

bridge: Harvard University Press.

By ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,

JR.

Cam-

1941. Pp. xiv, 634.

Professor Chafee's admirable volume, which few if any are as well equipped
to write, is the most comprehensive available survey of law and practice
under the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. Its publication
on the eve of our entrance into the second World War could hardly have
been more timely in view of the pertinence of the section dealing with legislation and prosecutions during the first World War. One regrets he lacked
time to examine other recent restrictions on civil liberties as thoroughly as he
has the Federal Sedition Act of 1940, but he has done a great deal. The book
contains a survey of methods'of controlling discussion, a history of the law of
sedition, an analysis of state and federal legislation affecting free speech, and
a review of judicial decisions through March 1941. Much of the material
is revised from Professor Chafee's earlier writing, but the treatment of the
years 1930-1940 and some other topics is new, and all of it is brought together
in this convenient volume, which contains a detailed index, a useful appendix
of references to relevant statutes, and extensive citations to decisions and other
literature.
Restrictions in bills of rights are to be read together with constitutional
grants and reservations of authority, and concrete applications will vary with
the medium of communication involved, e.g, speech or book, and with the
circumstances, e.g., war and peace. There seems to be consensus that the
constitutional guarantees prohibit censorship and that juries are to pass not
only on the fact of expression but also on its character. On the test of the
criminality of an utterance, however, agreement ceases. Many hold that
governments are not required to wait until danger of unlawful activity resulting from expressions is imminent, but may proscribe utterances which have
a bad tendency. Others, including Professor Chafee, insist that the Constitution "forbids the punishment of words for their injurious tendencies," and,
in the words of Justice Holmes, that "the question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." In other words, protection is
to be given to free speech under the clear and present danger test not only
by jury trial but also by judicial review of restrictive statutes. Professor
Chafee concedes that the Constitution authorizes limitations on free speech
for public safety, morality, etc., but he argues that it also protects the
individual's interest in expression and "the interest of the community in the
discovery and dissemination of truth." The latter is apt to be overlooked,
but "should be the biggest weight in the scale" when these interests conflict. Professor Chafee takes some comfort from the fact that echoes of
the earlier dissenting voices of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis are to be
heard in recent majority opinions. It is true that the Supreme Court, notably
under Chief Justice Hughes, has read the first amendment into the fourteenth
in a way to "safeguard modes appropriate for assuring the right to utterance
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in different situations." But most of these cases involved situations which at
heart were censorship about whose illegality there has not been much question;
and one notes that the decisions in the Abrans and Gitlow cases, upholding
federal and state laws punishing utterances with a bad tendency, still stand,
and recalls the solicitude expressed for the police power in the recent flagsalute case.
Partly for these reasons perhaps, chiefly because he thinks it the more
important question, Professor Chafee devotes much attention to the wisdom
as distinguished from the constitutionality of laws restricting free speech.
He believes that ordinary criminal law protects us adequately against the violence which sedition laws are supposed to prevent but do not, while their
application in unexpected ways results in new abuses such as suppression of
much that is good, prevention of discovery of grievances, and encouragement
of radicals to bore from within "respectable" organizations or to resort to
violence when agitation appears futile. "No one has yet invented a gun which
will kill a wolf in sheep's clothing and will not hit a sheep. We should all be
glad to have a law, 'Bad men shall be imprisoned,' if it would work, but we
know that it would nbt." Professor Chafee thinks that the doctrines of bad tendency and constructive intent are inconsistent with free speech and genuine
discussion of public affairs. The difficulties experienced by human beings, with
all their frailties, in applying these vague tests are underscored by the depressing section of his book which deals with prosecutions under the Espionage
Act of 1917. "It became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of bond
issues . . . to urge that a referendum should have preceded our declaration of
war, to say that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ.... It was in no
way necessary that these expressions of opinion should be addressed to soldiers
or men on the point of enlisting or being drafted. Most judges held it enough
if the words might conceivably reach such men.. ." Professor Chafee would
combat force with force, words with words. But the federal law under which
these prosecutions occurred is in effect again after remaining dormant between
the wars, and Congress went beyond itin 1940 to enact the first peace-time
sedition law since 1798-including guilt by association for good measure, while
the statute books of the states contain many similar restrictive laws.
Let no one suppose that free speech is a luxury with which we can dispense
for the duration. The problem is complicated, no doubt, by fifth-columns
and by the importance of civilian morale in total war, so that appeals to precedents 1801-1916 may not be entirely relevant. But it must be remembered
also that never has the nation engaged in war with more at stake or with so
great a need for hard and clear thinking. The conduct of the war itself is not
the only activity which may benefit from free speech. Public discussion of the
peace to follow is just as important in view of the general expectation that
this time there will be no "return to normalcy", domestic or international.
We may learn something from those who would be imprisoned under sedition
laws or intimidated into silence by fear of punishment. "The real value of
freedom of speech is not to the minority that wants to talk, but to the
majority that does not want to listen."
What happens to free speech during the war and after will depend on the
interplay of many forces. The legislatures already have enacted laws under
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which extensive suppression is possible and they seem prepared to go even
further. The courts, if the past is a guide, will uphold most of this
legislation, or else will not interfere with prosecutions until it is too latethe Espionage Act first reached the Supreme Court in 1919, but this may
be a longer war. Free speech will depend to a greater extent on executive
officers who possess very broad discretion. Attorney General Francis Biddle
is reported to intend that the "persecutions which were such a dark chapter
in our record of the last World War" shall not be repeated; and federal district attorneys have been required at the very outset of this war to secure
approval of the Department of Justice before proceeding with prosecutions for
sedition-a procedure not adopted until almost the end of the last war. But all
this will not, except by possible example, restrain police and prosecutors
enforcing state and local legislation which may be directed against opposition
to war under the ruling in Gilbert v. Minnesotct. In the final analysis, however, the result will be determined by the public which "gets just as much
freedom of speech as it really wants." Professor Chafee hopes that repetition of the worst of the last war's excesses may be checked by shame bred of
their memory, by the lessons of intolerance in the totalitarian states, and by
judicial expansion of constitutional guarantees of free speech; to which one
may add the general support of the war instead of opposition by the left, the
presence of the U.S.S.R. among the United Nations, and the emphasis in war
aims on the "four freedoms". But one must add also that hysteria, which
recent legislation has not discouraged, may be whipped up easily as the burdens
of our "all-out" effort grow heavier and the setbacks inevitable to war occur;
that persecution of supposed sympathizers with foreign persecutors may have
wide appeal; that fear of communism persists and "red-baiting" is uncertainly
and probably temporarily in abeyance; and that "when war begins, all thinking stops" while memories are short. "At this day there are no new principles of freedom of speech. All the essentials have been said many times, but
the trouble i's that people pay very little attention to them."
Professor Chafee has succeeded in his endeavor to be "intelligible to a man
or woman without legal training." His lucid, witty, and not infrequently
eloquent exposition will give aid and comfort to those who have agreed with
him and should convert many who have dissented. One hopes the volume will
find many readers not only among lawyers, to whom it will be a valuable guide
and reference, but also among laymen; that through them both it will reach a
wider audience; and even that a booklet of extracts can be prepared for
popular circulation. We are indebted to Professor Chafee for clarifying our
thinking on these difficult problems in the wise solution of which all of us have
a heavy stake.
Elias Husar*
Ithaca, New York
*Instructor in Government, Cornell University
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International Executive Agreements: Democratic Procedure Under The
Constitution of The United States. By WALLACE MCCLURE.

Columbia University Press. 1941.

New York:

Pp. xxii, 449.

International Legislation: A Collection Of The Texts Of Multipartite
International Instruments Of General Interest. Vol. VII: 1935 - 1937
(Numbers 402-505).
Edited by MANLEY 0. HUDSON.
Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1941. Pp. xlix, 1026.
Mr. McClure's book is a very elaborate piece of special pleading to justify
Presidential disregard of the Senate in the conclusion of- international agreements. The Constitution is explicit that the President "shall have power by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur", but Mr. McClure concludes that "the
clearly deducible meaning and intent of the Constitution" justify the President
in disregarding the Senate by making "executive agreements" with foreign
states.
The author's argument proceeds along several lines, each of which, he
informs us, is "believed to be a column of sufficient strength to support the
weight of the conclusion", and, taken together, they form "a sturdy tripod
upholding the correctness and the constitutionality of the executive agreement". In his first arguments the author is on solid ground. From the
earliest days of the first administration of George Washington, presidents
have concluded international executive agreements which they have not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. During the one hundred and
fifty years since 1789 over 1200 executive agreements have been concluded
with foreign states. During the same period only 800 treaties were concluded
under the two-thirds rule, an additional 100 instruments having been rejected
or pigeonholed by the Senate. Mr. McClure presents some very interesting
statistics showing that one-half of the executive agreements concluded have
been made since 1920. He takes pains to demonstrate that scarcely any subject on which treaties have been made has not also been the subject of an
executive agreement, thus disposing of the argument that treaties deal with
important matters while executive agreements are limited to routine matters
such as postal agreements.
Some of the items referred to by Mr. McClure as executive agreements
appear to be strangely classified. For example, to term the Open Door notes
of 1899 or the admission of Texas to the Union by joint resolution of Congress, executive agreements, seems to the reviewer to stretch a point unnecessarily. Nevertheless, the presidential practice of concluding international
agreements Without reference to the Senate has developed, as the author says,
into a constitutional usage; and one may conclude with David Hunter Miller
that "to doubt their validity in law at this day would be almost as futile as to
doubt their existence in fact".
Other arguments of the author are less happily advanced. He believes
that the president has, and was intended to have, "unlimited authority" under
the Constitution to make executive agreements, but must not violate the
"substantive" provisions of the Constitution. He qualifies this position, how-
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ever, by a rather remarkable rule of constitutional interpretation "that in view
of the axiom of democracy that the legislative branch of the government should
normally control the Executive, Congress apparently possesses the final power
in case of conflict between a legislative and an executive act". He concludes
that vith the cooperation of Congress the president can accomplish by executive agreement anything he can accomplish by treaty (p. 344), but elsewhere
(p. 372) he assures us that Congress has no constitutional power to authorize
executive agreements.
At times the argument seems to wobble a bit, but one gathers that the
author regards the two-thirds rule as "a denial of democracy" which has
harmed both "the country and the world at large". He concludes that the
two-thirds rule may well be retained for treaties "about which no public
opinion exists", but that "for controversial international acts" the Senate
should be ignored by the president! Just why this should be termed by the
author the "democratic" procedure of making treaties does not become clear.
In volume VII of his useful series, "International Legislation," Judge
Hudson has reproduced the texts of 140 multipartite instruments signed
during the three year period 1935-1937. The list includes conventions of the
International Labor Office, the Pan American Conferences, the Montreux and
Nyon conferences, and many treaties on communications and transit, as well
as a number of regional multipartite agreements. The collection and publication of these international instruments in a handy volume with the excellent
editorial and bibliographical notes of Judge Hudson is a public service of
great value.
Herbert W. Briggs*
Ithaca, N. Y.

Administrative Law. By JAMEs A. PIKE and HENRY G.
Matthew Bender & Company, 1941. Two volumes.

FISCHER.

Albany:

The preface to the first edition of one of the most important casebooks in
this subject states "Administrative law is groping; it necessarily is still crudely empirical".'
It is the thesis of the authors of this administrative law
service that the subject has grown up, and that indeed it "bids fair to become
the man of the house."
As this branch of the law struggled for recognition in the law school curriculum, and later as it became increasingly important in the consciousness of
the lawyer, the legislator and the judge, one fact became obvious. Despite
all of the heat engendered i'n discussion of the topic and of various of its
phases, there was very, very little light on the subject itself. The masters
of the learning could hardly agree on the limits of their field. The sources
of knowledge were hidden in many index-headings not at all related to the
major interests of those who sought information in administrative law.
*Professor of Political Science, Cornell University
1

Preface, FRANKFURTER

AND DAVISON, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(lst ed.) p. vi.
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One of the symptoms of maturity in any branch of the law is in its receptivity to classification. Hence to publish an administrative law service required,
-not as an academic exercise-but as stern, practical necessity,--the formulation of a survey of the field, its boundaries, its component parts,--analysis
and synthesis in the finest sense of the words. The result of these processes
is "The Guide", called by the authors, "the first attempt at a comprehensive
analytical classification of the many heretofore scattered problems which have
come to be loosely associated under the label 'Administrative Law'." 2 These
authors did not minimize the importance of this part of their work,-n9r should
they. It must have been the first task to which they addressed themselves,
and many times thereafter preliminary results must have been revised to
include or reallocate additional items. Decimal in form, the classification as
published is thoroughly adaptable to new headings and sub-headings. The
result can be viewed only with admiration. Of course the merits of such a
classification'system can only be known finally when it is applied to the practical tasks of technical research. My own testimony, based both on hearsay
and on experience, is that it is adequate.
There are other features of the service which merit comment: the so-called
"agency table" which relates the material in other divisions of the service
to the various federal agencies with which the service concerns itself; the
"word index" which is the starting point for use of "The Guide", "to which
reference must always be made in order to determine whether any material is
available on the particular point and to learn the nature and exact location of
such material;"3 the tables; the bibliography, and its emphasis on available
text material, and its splendid collection of law review articles and notes.
One should also comment on the introductions to each of the major divisions
of the texts, and especially the scope-notes of "The Guide". These so-called
scope-notes, if collected together, would themselves form a significant and
comprehensive essay in the field of administrative law. The literary style
compels interest, and that is in itself a recommendation for such a service
as this. One receives an impression of personality and of authorship. The
service is the better because those responsible for it can be identified.
It may be suggested, without deprecation of the service, that the scope of
the service could be extended with profit to its subscribers.. The federal
jurisdiction is unquestionably important. Federal regulation and administration are both significant and illustrative of striking developments. But state
administrative law is quite as important to many lawyers.4 The controversy
over the Logan-Walter bill never resulted in the pitch of excitement nationally
that was reached in the 1938 general election in New York over the proposi!!See The Guide, Introductory Note.
8See
The Word Index, Introductory Note.
4

No inference is intended that the present service completely ignores state law. See,

for example, current precedents and materials for the service, Jan. 5, 1942, Decision note
No. 84, discussing the significant decision of the New York Court of Appeals in People
ex rel Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468 (1941). See also News
Letter, Oct. 27, 1941, discussing a California statute, Chapter 628 of the Statutes of 1941,
providing for compilation and publication of all existing regulations of administrative
agencies of that state. There certainly is, however, federal significance in the Prisament
case supra.
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tion designated as "No. 5" by the 1938 Constitutional Convention, subsequently defeated at the polls, containing a provision for compulsory judicial
review of administrative determinations in the proposed Article VI of the
New York Constitution.- I venture to say that the recent publication of his
report to Governor Lehman by Mr. Robert H. Benjamin, Moreland Act Commissioner, will be quite as important material as the comparable recent reports
in the federal jurisdiction. This is a federal administrative law service; there
is an important field of state administrative law virtually untouched. I do
not minimize the difficulties and the great mass of material. Those who solved
the problem of classification inherent in the formulation of "The Guide" should
be able to solve this one. The service can only be truly inclusive when it
includes state as well as federal material, even if some selection is thereby
required. Let us not come to think of administrative law as federal law only;
to many practitioners, the law of the states is the greatest field of professional
activity.
I am confident that the service will succeed, and I hope that it will be
expanded. It deserves success-for both its academic and its most significant
practical value.
John W. MacDonald*
Ithaca, N. Y.

Cases On Security Transaction.

Volume II, Mortgages.

F. WALSH and LAURENCE P. SIMPSON.

Co.

1941.

By WILLIAM

St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing

pp. 584.

Mortgages is the subject of one of those staple, old-line property courses
which for years have been strong points in the law school curriculum. In the
more recent emphasis on public law the courses dealing with security devices
have, more steadfastly than some of their fellows, held their ground against
the challenge of innovation. No doubt this is due in part to the expansion of
the credit system in modern business, but it is also attributable in large measure to the present-day importance which the student of mortgages finds in
those historic struggles from.which the chancellor emerged with perhaps his
most glowing victory over the straight-jacket justice of the law courts.
More recently it has been demonstrated that the law of mortgages is not
confined to narrow questions of private property rights but must be prepared
to yield before the impact of economic upheaval. The "dour thirties" brought
us moratorium statutes and the reorganization type of bankruptcy legislation
in the hope of stabilizing the economic front by relieving the state of siege
to which the secured creditor was able to subject his debtor and now after only
partial success a war-torn world must face new attacks on old citadels, legal
as well as social and political. Such are the thoughts that cross one's mind as
he attempts to appraise a new casebook in a field where law is at once venerable and up-to-date.
5
See Art. vi, § 27, as proposed. New York Constitutional Convention (1938) Document No. 16, p. 82.
*Professor of Law, Cornell University.
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The Preface tells us that "Cases on Security Transactions" has been prepared in two volumes by Professors William F. Walsh and Laurence P.
Simpson "after considerable experiment at New York University."1 Volume
II, here reviewed, is the first to make its appearance and contains a collection
of materials for a one-semester course of two hours a week in the law of
mortgages. It is the work of Professor Walsh, whose name has long been
associated with writings in the field of property and mortgage law.
There is nothing spectacular or modernistic about this case-book. If you
seek something new, if you are not satisfied without statistics, case histories,
encyclopedic footnotes or reports of public commissions and real estate boards,
your disappointment is assured. But if you are interested in an effective teaching tool in the best traditions of the case-book system, here is a carefully
planned sequence of interesting and instructive decisions which should satisfy
the most exacting disciple of Langdell and Ames. The choice of cases is
excellent and their arrangement bears the marks of thoughtful experience.
The editor has not striven unduly to replace old landmarks with bases of very
recent vintage and one who has done some work in the field of mortgages
greets every other case as an old acquaintance. It is evident that Professor
Walsh knows that brand new decisions are not necessarily the best for teaching purposes and that in the immediate past there have been few outstanding
developments in the law, as opposed to the social and economic problems, of
the mortgage relationship.
The book has a very distinct New York flavor. Of 150 cases set out at
length in the text 72 were decided in the New York courts and all but 9 of
them were decided by the Court of Appeals of that state. While this may be
explained in part by Professor Walsh's interest in his own students at New
York University Law School, the predominance of New York materials is
not inappropriate in view of the outstanding part played by the New York
courts in the development of the lien theory of mortgage.
The content of the book is for the most part orthodox and conventional.
Chapter 12 deals briefly with the nature and history of the mortgage and
contrasts the common law and lien theories. Chapter 23 contains an excellent arrangement of materials on equitable mortgages. In Chapter 3,4
under the heading "The Mortgage Debt", there are leading cases on the subject of mortgages as security for future advances and adequate treatment is
given the problems arising from the absence of a valid personal obligation for
the mortgage to collateralize. Chapter 45 deals with "Rights and Duties of
Mortgagor and Mortgagee", including the topics of possession, repair, waste,
injuries to the security, taxes and insurance. "Priority" (including the application of the recording acts) and "Discharge" of mortgages are respectively
the subject of Chapters 56 and 6,7 and "The Right of Redemption" is briefly
lIn Volume I it is planned to combine materials in suretyship and personal security
transactions.
2
WALSH

AND SIMPSON, CASES ON SECURITY TRANSACTIONS,

3Id 28-91.
4Id. 92-126.
5
1d. 127-185.
61d. 186-232.
7
1d. 233-275.

Volume II,

1-27.
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considered in Chapter 7.8 The questions which arise when land is conveyed
subject to a mortgage are covered in Chapter 89 while Chapter 910 deals with
"Subrogation, Contribution and Exoneration" and Chapter 1011 with "Marshalling". In Chapter 1112 under the heading "Assignment of Mortgages",
attention is given to the requisite form of the assignment, the effect of the
assignment upon defenses to the mortgage and the applicability of the recording
acts and of the principles of estoppel. Chapter 1213 contains a very satisfactory
arrangement of cases on the subject of foreclosure, with a passing glance
at strict foreclosure and a more complete treatment of the modem method of
foreclosure by action sale, including the parties to the action and the effect of
acceleration clauses and extension agreements. Chapter 1314 deals with the
foreclosure sale, deficiency judgments, receivers of rents and profits, surplus
money proceedings and statutory redemption after sale. Chapter 1415 gives
brief notice to foreclosure by sale pursuant to a power contained in a mortgage.
The choice and order of material in Chapters 12 and 13 are particularly
praiseworthy and the recent developments in deficiency judgment legislation
and, to a lesser degree, the mortgage moratorium laws receive attention. One
regrets the absence of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
Gelfert v. National City Bank'6 upholding the constitutionality of New York's
permanent deficiency judgment procedure even as a retroactive measure and
reversing the New York Court of Appeals whose opinion is set out in the
text."7 The Supreme Court decision is, however, noted and the editor's
criticismin s of the New York decision is a convincing brief for its reversal.
Though not pretentious, the notes throughout the book are well placed and of
high quality and always have something to, add to the points made in the cases.
They contain incisive comments by the editor as well as references to additional
authorities and they are generally keyed to Professor Walsh's excellent text
on the law of mortgages, a book which in sound crftical analysis more than
compensates for what it lacks in size.
The scope of the book is confined to the real estate mortgage and the only
treatment of chattel mortgages is to be found in the section devoted to the
subject of mortgages of after-acquired property.19 In view of the general
emphasis on New York law, it seems more space could well have been assigned
to the New York peculiarities in the field of after-acquired property mortgages
and in the allied field of mortgages of merchandise. There is a total absence of
any material on the mortgagee's rights in fixtures and personal property
Sd. 276-306.
9
1d. 307-336.
lOd. 337-356.
1"Id. 357-377.
121d. 378-431.
3Id. 432-492.
14Id. 493-573.

15Id. 574-584.
16313 U. S. 221, decided April 28, 1941.
17National City Bank v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 16 (1940), WALSH
note
2, 516.
1
SWALSH AND SImpsoiN, op. cit. note 2, 527.
9
1 1d. 76-91.

AND

SIMPsoN, op. Cit.

1942]

BOOK REVIEWS

attached to and used in connection with the mortgaged premises, especially
as against conditional vendors. While it is planned to take up these questions
in Volume I as part of the treatment of personal security transactions, including
the conditional sale and chattel mortgage, their absence leaves Volume II with
an appearance of incompleteness and this may be a deterrent to its adoption by
teachers of law who are not in a position also to use Volume I or so to adjust
other courses that a subject of such practical importance may receive the
attention it deserves.
There is only one place where the order of treatment may be open to some
question. Chapter 1 takes up the subject of possession for the purpose of contrasting the rights of the parties under common law and lien theories. In
Chapter 4 the rights and duties of the so-called "mortgagee in possession"
receive attentfon. The cases on receivers of rents and profits are- deferred
to Chapter 13. However logical this division may be, some teachers would
prefer not to disperse these topics but to develop the subject of possession
in one chapter beginning with the legal rights created by the bare mortgage
itself, progressing through the special status of mortgagees in possession and
finally taking up the receivership and the modern contractural devices, such
as assignments of rents, by which mortgagees seek to obtain the advantages
while avoiding the expense of a receiver.
Joseph W. McGovern*
New York, New York

Corporate Executives' Compensation. By GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON,
New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1942. Pp. xii, 519.
This book is issued at an appropriate time, as there is much current interest
in the subject matter and there are recent developments which have not heretofore been treated in law books. It may come as a matter of surprise to
members of the profession that a full length law book can be written on this
particular subject, yet there is nothing here that is superfluous.
Professor Washington approaches the problem of managerial compensation
with fairness, and not with the idea that management is usually predatory.
He has had practical experience and, as he says in his preface, he came to be
interested in this subject through his assisting in extended litigation involving
the validity and effect of a bonus plan, and later he was asked to help prepare
a number of compensation contracts for corporate officials. He says further
that during the last several years he made it his task to track down and analyze as many problems relating to this subject as he could, that as his research
progressed he was led into one field after another: taxation, accounting,
federal securities legislation, governmental restrictions, corporate custom and
practice, economic theory.
About one-third of the book is devoted to a discussion of the form, substance,
legality and tax effects of executive salary contracts, profit-sharing arrangements, stock bonus plans, management stock-holding trust plans (such as
*Lecturer in Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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the General Motors plan), stock options and bargain purchases, deferred
compensation plans and executive pensions (including pensions for past
services) and annuities. The author studied many recent contracts filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. To aid the lawyer the text includes
quotations from, or whole contracts entered into by corporations whose names
are given.
Prominent among the factors to be carefully considered by corporations
and lawyers in the preparation of compensation contracts are the income tax
effects. In view of the heavy taxes now imposed on corporations, there is a
tendency towards liberal compensation, and the corporate client looks to the
lawyer for definite advice as to when and to what extent payments under
compensation contracts or plans are deductible from gross income for income
tax purposes. Difficult problems arise, especially when stock is issued as a
bonus or is sold at a price that may be deemed to be a bargain, or compensation is spread over a period longer than that of full time service, or the employer expressly assumes a part or all of the employee's tax burden, or a
bonus, life insurance, annuity or other compensation trust is to be drawn so
that, if possible, the employer may take a tax deduction in the year in which
he makes payments into the trust fund and the employees shall not become
liable for income taxes thereon until distributions are actually made to them
or for their benefit. These objectives require care and skill on the part of the
lawyer, and he must have a "tax awareness" so that he may obtain for his
clients such tax advantages as are available. Accordingly, this book contains
an excellent discussion of such problems.
The author discusses the conflicting views of the Internal Revenue Bureau
and the BTA under Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Codd on the
question whether a bonus plan, to comply with that Section, must be for the
benefit of a "large percentage" of the employees, or, as the statute requires
and the BTA has held, for "some or all" employees. The Regulation quoted
on page 121 is as it stood prior to its amendment on June 3, 1940, when the
"large percentage" provision was eliminated. Further authority for the BTA
interpretation is Moore & Moore v. Comtvissioner, 45 BTA -, announced
December 18, 1941, which was after the book here reviewed went to press.
The author points out that a profit-sharing contract providing for the
payment of a given percentage of net earnings should clearly indicate whether
such net earnings are determined before or after deducting the bonus fund
itself as an expense, and also before or after deducting the actual federal
income taxes for the current year. It is easy for a draftsman to overlook such
questions and thereby create awkward problems in the computations.
A substantial part of the book is devoted to the legal requirements in the
adoption of a compensation contract, including a problem which has plagued
directors and corporation lawyers for many years; How can salaries be
validly "fixed and compensation contracts validly adopted when, as is often the
case, a majority of the officers are also directors of the corporation? The rule
against "self-dealing" conflicts with the right of persons to be paid for their
services when they serve with that understanding. The perfect solution to this
dilemma has not been found. "Cross-voting" is subject to question. The
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author recommends submission of such matters to the shareholders. In most
cases this is not considered feasible, and yet there are comparatively few cases
where their salary or compensation arrangements are attacked. This is probably due to the general rule, as Professor Washington points out, that in
most jurisdictions after compensation has been paid pursuant to a contract
or resolution involving "self-dealing", the stockholders can not require it
to be repaid except to the extent that it is found to be excessive, although the
burden of proof may be on the directors to sustain the reasonableness.
About one-fifth of the book is devoted to a discussion of legal controls
over amounts paid to executives, including the effect on such. However, as
no two corporations are alike, this part of the work is of interest to the lawyer
principally as indicating various factors, as for example, secrecy, which influence a court in holding compensation in a given case to be unreasonable.
About 140 pages are devoted to a discussion of indemnifying directors
and officers. There is a current wave of proposals to stock-holders to
indemnify directors and officers for their litigation expenses and in some
cases for their judgment liabilities, when they are not found guilty of official dereliction or 'negligence. The author has examined many such indemnity
by-laws as set forth in proxy statements filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
The author is sympathetic with the general idea that a director who is
unjustly attacked should be entitled to call on the corporation to bear the
litigation expenses. The author discusses all the case law on the subject,
which in general is opposed to the right to such reimbursement, but as he
points out, is not necessarily adverse to the power of a corporation to
reimburse.
'the author, quite properly, takes the view that reimbursement for litigation
expenses is one thing, whereas reimbursement for judgment liability is
another thing. The standard of conduct required by law or by good business
is not lowered if a director is reimbursed for his expenses when he has been
vindicated. The standard, however, is lowered when the corporation assumes
in advance not only the expenses but also any judgment against him based on
dereliction or negligence or other failure to conform to the required standard.
The author does not think that the courts generally will give effect to agreements which grant indemnity for judgment liability in stockholders' suits,
as distinguished from litigation expenses, pages 373-392. In my opinion the
treatment of this phase of the subject would be clearer if cast more in the
form of an argument, which it really is, for the author's point of view, as
there is almost no case law available. This is not to say that the author's
approach may not be the one the courts will take when questions now unsettled
will be submitted to them.
As shown by the many useful examples contained in the book, there is
quite a variance among current indemnity proposals in the scope of the
indemnity granted. So far as I know, this book contains the only up-to-date
and thorough treatise on this subject. Corporate practice on this subject is
still in a state of development.
The author discusses two amendments to the General Corporation Law of
New York, Sections 27-a and 61-a, enacted in 1941, which relate to indemnity,
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and he finds that these provisions are unclear in certain respects. His comments should be considered before similar provisions are enacted in other states.
In conclusion, it may be added that the Professor has a clear and concrete
style. He avoids the legal verbosity frequently indulged in as a display of
erudition. The points he makes are readily understood.
The profession will welcome this work which should be of great practical
value to those who are concerned with drafting documents in this field or in
attacking or defending compensation plans or in considering their tax effects.
The book fills a current need.
Paul J. Bickel*
Cleveland, Ohio

Success In Court. By FRANcIs L.

WELLMAN.

New York: The Mac-

millan Company 1941.
Mr. Wellman's latest book, Success In Court, should appeal to all lawyers
and to many laymen. To the layman, the many stories of battles of wits
between opposing counsel, not to mention between counsel and expert witnesses, will convey the flavor of that most dramatic of all institutions dealing
with problems of real life,-the trial court. The lawyer will find not only
pleasure and entertainment from the well-chosen and pointed anecdotes with
which the book is replete, but also will gain instruction which may serve him
in good stead.
For, as Mr. Wellman states in his preface, his object is both to instruct
and to entertain. In the judgment of this reviewer, he accomplishes both parts
of his two-fold purpose in admirable fashion.
Most students in law school have in the back of their minds a vague thought
that they will, in their practice, be engaged extensively i'n work in court. Even
today, although for many years specialization in different phases of practice
has meant that certain lawyers go to court seldom if at all, particularly in the
larger cities, it is the rare undergraduate who, on applying for a job, doesn't
ask whether he will be able to have some court experience.
The reason is obvious. The common law has developed through decided
cases and each law student who has been taught through the case system has
been engaged in learning principles of substantive law from opinions applying
those principles to facts in individual controversies. True, most, if not all, of
the opinions studied have been appellate courts, but the facts recited in those
opinions were, for the most part, developed upon actual trial. There the
witnesses were examined by opposing counsel. The "facts", stated so clearly
and concisely in the opinion of the appellate court, emerged bit by bit on the
trial and depended in no small measure upon the skill of counsel, whose job
it was to draw from the witnesses the necessary testimony to establish the
factual bases of their clients' claims.
Even the office lawyer, who seldom goes to court, has in mindI the necessity
for drawing contracts, preparing wills, keeping records, and advising as to
*Member of the Ohio Bar
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business and personal transactions, in such manner that the desired result will
stand the test, if later brought into court. He will be a better office lawyer
if he has engaged in some trial work and has experienced the atmosphere and
uncertainties of a trial.
"Success in Court" will, therefore, be of interest to all lawyers, whether
or not primarily office lawyers or trial lawyers. Those who do not wish
instruction will be entertained and absorbed by *the legal anecdotes.
The principals of substantive law are taught largely through the case system.
Mr. Wellman's new book, as well as his prior books' might be called informal
case books for trial work. He does not attempt to instruct by bare precept,
but bases each precept on an experience or "case" in point.
Half of the book is Mr. Wellman's. The remaining half has been contributed by outstanding lawyers renowned for success in court. Mr. John W.
Davis contributes a masterly chapter on the argument on appeal. Any lawyer
about to appear in an appellate court would do well to re-read his short essay.
Other chapters are contributed by Frederic R. Coudert (on international law),
Joseph DuVivier (on aspects of the international practice of an American
lawyer practicing in Paris), Martin W. Littleton (on the expert witness), and
Henry A. Uterhart (on the lawyer for the defense). Other phases of trial
practice are discussed by Floyd E. Thompson, Luther Day, Weymouth Kirkland and the late Emory R. Buckner. In his chapter, Mr. Buckner lays stress
upon the trial lawyer being willing to efface himself in advancing his client's
interests, stating, "The greatest compliment a trial lawyer who has won can
receive is to have the jury think and say afterward that the defeated side had
a better lawyer but the successful side had a better case."
While some divergence of views on trial methods is shown, these successful
practitioners are unanimous on the point. Each stresses the necessity for
hard, thorough and careful work in preparing a case for trial. Brilliant as
counsel may be, there is no substitute which will make up for lack of thorough
preparation. A large portion of the trial lawyer's heaviest labors is frequently
before the trial begins.
Anoiher point which is emphasized, not only by Mr. Wellman but by other
contributors is the value of experience. Mr. Wellman's books attempt to
enable the lawyer to gain from experiences of others. He himself used to pour
over the biographies and reminiscences of the great trial lawyers and says he
profited by so doing. By studying such experiences, the lawyer will undoubtedly benefit, but the experiences of others, while helpful, furnish no substitute
for personal experience. However, there must be a first time for everyone
and if the budding trial lawyer steeped himself in the trial experiences of
others, he will have less feeling of strangeness and uncertainty the first time he
is confronted in court with the necessity of cross-examining a hostile witness.
Eli Whitney Debevoise*
New York, New York
1"The Art of Cr6ss-Examination", "Day In Court", "Gentlemen Of The Jury" and
"Luck and Opportunity".
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